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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses how independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy councils) can strengthen 
the incentives for fiscal discipline. Several countries have recently established such 
institutions. By increasing fiscal transparency they can raise the awareness of the long-run 
costs of current deficits and increase the reputational costs for governments of violating their 
fiscal rules. Councils that make also normative judgements, where fiscal policy is evaluated 
against the government’s own pre-set objectives, are likely to be more influential than 
councils that do only positive analysis. To fulfil their role adequately, fiscal watchdogs should 
be granted independence in much the same way as central banks. There are arguments both in 
favour and against extending the remit of a fiscal policy council to include also tax, 
employment and structural policies. Whether or not this should be done depends on the 
existence of other institutions making macroeconomic forecasts and analysing fiscal policy, 
the existence of institutions providing independent analysis in other economic policy areas, 
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1 Introduction 
A number of OECD countries now find themselves in a situation with soaring government 
debt. The immediate cause is the deterioration of public finances in the economic crisis, 
which has resulted from both the working of automatic stabilisers and discretionary stimulus 
actions, including support to the financial sector in many countries. But the public finance 
problems also reflect weak budgetary positions at the onset of the crisis as well as insufficient 
adjustment to future demographic pressures. 
       Earlier  fiscal  rules  at  both  national and EU levels are now being violated in most 
European countries. It is therefore natural that much interest focuses on appropriate reforms 
of fiscal frameworks. There are clear parallels between current discussions of fiscal policy 
frameworks and earlier ones of monetary policy frameworks. In the sphere of monetary 
policy, an academic debate on rules versus discretion started in the late 1970s. Initially, 
reform proposals emphasised the importance of commitment to inflexible rules (for money 
supply growth or exchange rates). The last decades’ approach to central banking in most 
countries has, however, blurred the distinction between rules and discretion. Flexible inflation 
targeting means following a rule for interest rate setting, but with considerable discretion on 
how the rule is applied.
1 The most important break with the past is the delegation of monetary 
policy decision-making to central banks with a high degree of independence from the political 
system. 
       Although there have been many academic proposals on delegating some fiscal policy 
decisions to independent institutions, this idea has not been applied in practice. The reason is 
that fiscal policy-making is regarded as inherently much more “political” than monetary 
policy-making. There has, however, been a recent international trend towards setting up 
independent fiscal policy institutions, fiscal watchdogs, with the task of monitoring public 
finances. 
       This paper first reviews possible causes of excessive accumulation of government debt. It 
goes on to analyse briefly what role fiscal rules can play for mitigating such tendencies. The 
main topic is, however, how independent fiscal policy institutions can contribute to fiscal 
discipline. This discussion draws on experiences of such institutions in various countries in 
general and on the experiences of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council in particular. Fiscal 
indiscipline seems often too be associated with a lack of understanding of its long-run 
                                                 
1 It remains to be seen though whether the recent financial crisis will result in less transparent monetary policy 
frameworks with a larger amount of discretion as to how financial developments are taken into account. See, for 
example, Calmfors (2009a).   4
consequences. It can therefore be seen as a manifestation of the more general problem of too 
little analytical (research) input into the economic policy process. For this reason it is natural 
also to include a discussion of how to secure a sufficiently large analytical input into 
economic policy-making in general and how independent institutions can contribute to that. 
 
2 Fiscal objectives and rules  
There has been a trend towards increased government debt in most OECD countries since the 
early 1970s. This has led many observers to conclude that modern democracies suffer from an 
inherent  deficit bias and a tendency to excessive accumulation of government debt. The 
concept of excessive debt accumulation is, however, vague. It should be taken to mean debt 
accumulation in excess of what is in the long-run interest of the majority of voters, but the 
meaning of this depends on the theoretical model at hand. 
 
2.1 Explanations of excessive government debt accumulation 
Since the choice of appropriate fiscal institutions is likely to depend on the underlying causes 
of debt accumulation, a short review of the research literature is a good starting point. A 
number of (partly overlapping) reasons for why unconstrained discretionary decision-making 
can lead to deficit bias have been identified. 
1.  Insufficient understanding among both the electorate and politicians of the long-run 
constraints on fiscal policy. This could include a lack of understanding of both the 
intertemporal government budget constraint, according to which government solvency 
requires that future primary surpluses are at least as large as the outstanding net 
government debt, and of the requirements on future policy if it is to compensate for 
current deficits.
2 Lack of understanding of future policy demands seems often to be 
associated with overoptimism (“this time is different”, allowing more leeway than 
earlier) or overconfidence (underestimation of the variability of future shocks).
3 
2.  Politicians acting in their own interest rather than in the interest of the electorate.
4 
This can occur through rent-seeking behaviour in a wide sense (including, for 
example, prestigious projects with little value for society or benefits to the own 
constituency and various interest groups). It is made possible to the extent that lack of 
fiscal transparency or insufficient knowledge on the functioning of the economy on 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Swedish Fiscal Policy (2009), Appendix 1, regarding the intertemporal budget constraint.  
3 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010). 
4 See von Hagen (2010).   5
the part of voters makes it difficult for them to efficiently monitor the behaviour of 
politicians. According to one version of the argument, rent-seeking behaviour can 
together with fiscal opacity lead to procyclical policy, because voters demand more 
government consumption and lower taxes in good times to prevent higher tax revenues 
from being wasted on political rents.
5 A related argument focuses instead on political 
business cycles: the voters’ difficulties of evaluating macroeconomic outcomes give 
incumbent governments an incentive before elections to signal their competence 
through deficit-increasing measures that boost the economy in the short run.
6 
3.  Short-sightedness  in the sense that too little weight is attached to the future. An 
obvious explanation is that the political parties in power may have a higher discount 
rate than the electorate because some of the future costs of current deficits will be 
borne by other parties if the current government is not re-elected. This presupposes 
that the preferences of politicians are not perfectly aligned with those of the electorate 
(as discussed in the preceding item). A possible explanation is that political parties 
represent different constituencies with differing preferences regarding the composition 
of government spending or the trade-off between taxes and government spending. This 
may create an incentive for the party in power to accumulate debt for the strategic 
reason to constrain the policies of future governments with different preferences.
7 
4.  Time inconsistency, which means that policies that are optimal ex ante are no longer so 
ex post. The implication is that governments may initially decide plans on fiscal 
restraint but later renege on them. One explanation is that optimal fiscal policy 
depends on the private sector’s expectations of policy which influence its behaviour. 
For example, it makes sense for a government ex ante to induce expectations of low 
inflation, resulting in low wage increases, but ex post, once this has been done, to 
pursue more expansionary fiscal policy to reduce unemployment, which can then be 
achieved at a lower cost of inflation than would otherwise be the case. But if the 
private sector realises this, expectations never adjust to the government’s announced 
plans and the economy ends up in a bad equilibrium with high deficits.
8 Similarly, 
even if governments in advance rule out support to financial markets to reduce moral 
hazard problems, support is likely to be deemed optimal once irresponsible behaviour 
                                                 
5 Alesina et al. (2008) and Andersen and Westh Nielsen (2010). 
6 Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
7 Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). 
8 This form of time inconsistency was first discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) in the context of monetary 
policy. Agell et al. (1996) is an early application to fiscal policy.    6
has caused losses involving systemic risks, which undermines the credibility of an 
announced non-accommodation policy. Time-inconsistent policy could also be the 
result of time-inconsistent preferences implying that people (and thus governments) 
are more impatient when they make short-run trade-offs than when they make long-
run ones. Ex ante rates of time preferences may then motivate a certain pace of deficit 
reduction in the future, but once the future arrives decision makers could find 
themselves more impatient (with a higher rate of time preference) than initially and 
therefore choose to postpone the deficit reduction.
9  
5.  Common-pool problems, which arise because government spending is usually targeted 
on individual groups, but financed out of general taxes. Individual groups therefore 
lobby for spending on their preferred programmes without considering the full 
budgetary costs now as well as in the future. This can lead to both overspending and 
excessive debt accumulation for the same reasons as the absence of clearly defined 
property rights over natural resources can lead to overexploitation of them.
10 A special 
case of the common-pool problem is wars of attrition over budgetary consolidations. 
They imply that, in a situation of unsustainable deficits, each group in society – and 
the political party representing it – tries to postpone the necessary fiscal adjustment in 
the hope that the burden of adjustment can be shifted on to other groups.
11  
 
2.2 Fiscal rules  
Fiscal rules are widely seen as an appropriate method to offset tendencies to excessive debt 
accumulation. By a fiscal rule I mean a well-defined target or constraint for fiscal policy (or a 
set of targets or constraints) as well as principles (guidelines) for how deviations from these 
targets or constraints are to be handled.
12 A specific budget outcome or a specific path for 
government debt over a certain period are examples of targets. Deficit and debt ceilings as 
well as expenditure ceilings are examples of constraints. Such targets and constraints do not 
have a value of their own, but should instead be seen as intermediate objectives formulated 
with the aim of making it easier to attain more fundamental, higher-level objectives. 
 
                                                 
9 Modern analysis of intra-personal preference reversals was pioneered by Laibson (1997) using so-called 
hyperbolic discount functions (as opposed to conventional exponential discount functions). Bertelsmann (2009) 
has applied this analysis to public debt. See also Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010).   
10 See von Hagen and Harden (1994) and Velasco (2000). 
11 Alesina and Drazen (1991). 
12 The seminal work on the principles to be observed when formulating fiscal rules is Kopits and Symansky 
(1998).   7
Higher-level fiscal objectives 
One can conceive of a number of higher-level objectives for budget and debt policy:
13 
  Long-run  fiscal sustainability, implying that the government needs to meet its 
intertemporal budget constraint, that is be able to service its debt. This is, however, 
only a restriction, not an objective: since many paths for government debt are 
consistent with this requirement, it does not pin down a specific path (nor an end 
point). 
  Social efficiency, which gives a motive for tax smoothing, that is to even out 
(marginal) tax rates over time. This minimises the distortionary costs of taxation and 
thus contributes to the smoothing of consumption over time for households, which is 
welfare-improving. 
  Intergenerational equity. What should be regarded an equitable distribution of welfare 
across generations depends on value judgements. But a common value judgement is 
that each generation should pay for its own costs.
14 
  Precautionary savings to prepare for unanticipated contingencies. These could refer to 
both the short and the long term. In the short term, an important objective is to provide 
room of manoeuvre for stabilisation policy by staying clear of the critical debt level at 
which default premia on government bonds start rising rapidly.
15 In the long term, the 
objective is to provide buffers against, for example, future increases in equilibrium 
employment that put strains on public finances.  
 
These higher-level objectives could motivate different types of fiscal rules as well as different 
numerical values for the targets/constraints chosen. According to most models, the tax-
smoothing motive does not imply a target for government debt: instead debt should act as a 
buffer against public finance shocks and follow a random walk. This is consistent with a 
deficit target “without memory” where past deviations from the target should not be 
compensated.
16 In contrast, a debt target or a deficit target “with memory” is more in line with 
an objective for distribution across generations.
17 Such formulations would also square with 
                                                 
13 Auerbach (2008) and Finanspolitiska rådet (2008) discuss these higher-level objectives in more detail.  
14 This value judgement has been clearly formulated by, for example, the Swedish government. See 
Finansdepartementet (2010) and Budget Bill (2010). Implicit in such considerations is a rejection of the so-called 
Ricardian view that the current generation adequately represents future generations. 
15 See, for example, Bi and Leeper (2010) for an analysis of this. 
16 See Wren-Lewis (2010a).  
17 A debt target and a deficit target over a longer period are similar since a fixed annual deficit as a percentage of 
GDP implies that the debt ratio converges to a specific value. See, for example, Finanspolitiska rådet (2008).   8
the precautionary motive to the extent that interest rates on sovereign debt are related to the 
debt level.  
       In principle, it is not possible to decide an adequate intermediate fiscal target without first 
taking a stand on the relative importance of the various higher-level objectives. Unfortunately, 
this is rarely done. For example, the Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden has repeatedly criticised 
the government for its failure to explain how its so-called surplus target, according to which 
government net lending should amount to one per cent of GDP over a business cycle, has 
been derived from the various higher-level fiscal objectives.
18 In the long term, such lack of 
motivations could threaten the legitimacy of a fiscal target.  
       The determination of an intermediate fiscal deficit or debt target should take into account 
the interaction with other policies. There is an obvious such interaction with future 
employment developments, in particular with the development of the retirement age. 
Prefunding through fiscal surpluses now and later retirement can be seen as substitutes for 
each other when it comes to meeting the future fiscal changes arising from an ageing 
population. This provides a strong argument for simultaneous determination of fiscal targets 
and future employment targets (including policies to raise the retirement age), so that 
appropriate trade-offs can be made.
19 
 
The role of intermediate objectives 
The rationale for fiscal rules regarding intermediary targets/constraints is that it is likely easier 
to agree on policies that reflect “true” social preferences when the choice is framed as an ex 
ante matter of principle rather than as a concrete policy choice in a specific situation. One 
should expect the risks of policy “slippage” to be smaller if policy in the short and medium 
term can be evaluated against a simple, well-defined benchmark rather than against more 
complex, higher-level objectives.  
              The exact logic depends, however, on the perceived causes of deficit bias under 
discretionary decision-making. A decision on rules can be seen as being taken under “a veil of 
ignorance” regarding who will be in government in the future. It should therefore help offset 
deficit bias arising from political rent-seeking and short-sightedness deriving from limited 
periods of office. Decisions on rules would also address the time-inconsistency problems 
(arising from either the temptation to choose other policies once private-sector behaviour has 
                                                 
18 Finanspolitiska rådet (2008) and Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009, 2010). 
19 This point was elaborated in Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009). As a response to the council’s discussion, 
the Swedish government made it clear for the first time in the Spring Fiscal Policy Bill (2010) that prefunding 
should not finance future costs arising from increased longevity and higher quality of publicly financed welfare.   9
adjusted to particular policy expectations or from preference reversals over time) because they 
are taken ex ante and not ex post. Finally, rules might also help counteract the lack of 
internalisation of externalities inherent in the common-pool problem, as it offers an 
opportunity for agents to rise above the day-to-day struggle for resources. In contrast, one 
should not expect rules to help if the root cause of excessive debt accumulation is insufficient 
understanding of the long-run consequences of fiscal policy, unless the rules are imposed by 
external agents with better understanding than domestic legislators (as might be the case for 
some countries with EU fiscal rules).  
       Pragmatic considerations should play a role for the choice of intermediate objectives. One 
aspect concerns the possibility to verify fiscal outcomes. The problem of distinguishing 
between current expenditures and capital expenditures has been used as an argument against a 
golden-rule formulation according to which budget targets would encompass total 
government net savings (including net government investment) rather than just financial 
government net savings (net lending).
20  
       Pragmatic considerations also speak in favour of targets rather than constraints for fiscal 
policy. Experience suggests that constraints in the form of deficit or debt ceilings act as quite 
weak incentives for fiscal restraint, as governments often choose to stay close to these ceilings 
in ordinary times, which implies little leeway in the event of adverse shocks. One example is 
the EU stability pact, where many countries were so close to the deficit ceiling of three per 
cent of GDP that the violations in the economic crisis became very large. Another example is 
the earlier fiscal rule in the UK according to which government net debt should be below 40 
per cent of GDP. Since debt stayed close to this limit, the crisis has implied a huge violation 
of it with the consequence that the rule was abandoned.
21 
 
2.3 Credibility versus flexibility 
An important trade-off in the formulation of fiscal rules concerns credibility versus flexibility. 
Here, it is interesting to contrast the examples of Germany and Sweden. 
       Germany has recently reformed its fiscal framework by enshrining a new fiscal rule in its 
constitution.
22 The rule is a balanced-budget one: cyclically adjusted net borrowing should be 
zero. The rule is binding in the sense that it is followed up by a backward-looking indicator 
with memory. Deficits exceeding 0.35 per cent of GDP are accumulated in an account. When 
                                                 
20 Finanspolitiska rådet (2008). 
21 Office for Budget Responsibility (2010a,b) 
22 See Federal Ministry of Finance (2009),   10
the accumulated deficits exceed 1.5 per cent of GDP, the government is obliged to reduce 
them. Although this needs to be done only in cyclical upswings, the rule implies a strong 
commitment with limited possibilities of discretionary adjustment to unforeseen 
contingencies. 
       As discussed above, Sweden has the rule that government net lending should be one per 
cent of GDP over a business cycle. Given the difficulties of dating the cycle, this gives the 
government much discretionary leeway. The government uses five different indicators to 
evaluate whether the target is met: (i) a backward-looking ten-year average of actual net 
lending; (ii) a corresponding backward-looking average of cyclically adjusted net lending; 
(iii) a partly forward-looking seven-year average of net lending (encompassing actual 
outcomes three years back and forecasts for the current and the three coming years); (iv) a 
corresponding partly forward-looking average of cyclically adjusted net lending; and (v) 
current (this year’s) structural net lending.
23 There is an apparent lack of transparency because 
the indicators represent conceptually very different targets (both with and without memory) 
and can show very different outcomes. This approach appears to have been chosen because 
the government wants to retain a large amount of flexibility regarding how fiscal policy can 
be used as a stabilisation tool.
24 
       The German and Swedish approaches represent polar cases. The different choices may 
reflect that the “production possibility frontiers” with regard to credibility versus flexibility 
are different. The recent Swedish fiscal track record is better than the German one and a more 
flexible approach therefore probably entails a smaller credibility loss. 
       Still, it would appear possible to find a better trade-off between credibility and flexibility 
than in both Germany and Sweden. One in-between possibility would be to define a clear 
threshold just as in the German case (for example, a deviation of a certain magnitude from a 
well-defined past average of actual deficits), but not let this threshold automatically trigger a 
fiscal response. Instead, when passing the threshold the government could be obliged to 
explain to the parliament why the situation has arisen and whether a, and if so what, response 
is required.
25 This would serve to highlight the situation for the general public, but also give 
the government an opportunity to explicitly take the cyclical situation into account and 
possibly to reformulate future budget targets in response to the earlier deviation. The outlined 
procedure has some resemblance with the stipulation for the Governor of the Bank of England 
                                                 
23 Structural net lending incorporates adjustment for both the cycle and one-off fiscal measures. See Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council (2010). 
24 Finansdepartementet (2010) and Spring Fiscal Policy Bill (2010). 
25 Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2010) contains such a proposal.   11
to write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer when there has been a deviation of 
more than one percentage point from the inflation target.  
 
3 Independent fiscal watchdogs 
A way of strengthening incentives for fiscal discipline that has recently received widespread 
interest is to set up independent fiscal watchdogs. The establishment of such institutions with 
a remit to monitor public finances have recently been endorsed by European institutions such 
as the Ecofin Council, the European Commission and the ECB as well as by IMF staff 
members.
26 Several countries have also in recent years set up such independent fiscal 
institutions. They include Sweden (2007), Canada and Hungary (2008), Slovenia (2009) and 
the UK (2010).
27  
         The recent trend towards establishing fiscal watchdogs has two sources of inspiration. 
The first comes from earlier existing institutions with a similar remit. These include the High 
Council of Finance (HCF) in Belgium (originally established in 1936 but with an extended 
remit in 1989), the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in the Netherlands (from 1947), the 
Economic Council in Denmark (from 1962), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the 
US (from 1975) and the Public Debt Committee in Austria (from 2002). 
       The second source of inspiration has been a series of academic proposals on independent 
fiscal institutions. The first one was von Hagen and Harden (1994). Later ones include Wren-
Lewis (1996, 2002), Ball (1997), Blinder (1997), Calmfors (2003, 2005), Wyplosz (2002, 
2005) and Kirsanova et al. (2007).
28 In several cases delegation of some actual fiscal policy 
decisions to independent fiscal policy committees (“hard option”) has been proposed. For 
reasons of political realism the discussion here focuses only on independent institutions with 
advisory or monitoring tasks but without decision-making power (“soft option”). I label such 
institutions fiscal policy councils.
29 All existing fiscal watchdogs are of this type. 
 
3.1 Tasks of fiscal policy councils 
To analyse what the soft power of a fiscal policy council can achieve, it is helpful to start out 
from the discussion in Section 2.1 of various explanations of fiscal profligacy. It also makes 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Council of the European Union (2006), European Commission (2009) and ECB (2010) as 
well as Annett et al. (2005) and Debrun et al. (2009). 
27 See Debrun et al. (2009) and von Hagen (2010) for surveys of independent fiscal institutions. Mihály (2010)  
and Delpla (2010) also provide informative accounts of such institutions.  
28 See Calmfors (2005), Jonung and Larch (2006) and Debrun et al. (2009) for surveys of such academic 
proposals. 
29 This is the terminology used by, for example, Calmfors (2005), Wyplosz (2005), Rogoff and Bertelsmann 
(2010), Wren-Lewis (2010a) and von Hagen (2010).     12
sense to distinguish between the impact that could occur also in the absence of fiscal rules and 
the impact that may arise in conjunction with such rules. 
      Fiscal councils could obviously have a direct disciplining effect to the extent that a deficit 
bias depends on insufficient understanding of the long-run consequences of fiscal policy 
among both politicians and voters or on politicians acting in their own interest.
30 A council 
could increase awareness of the future costs of current deficits. It could help offset tendencies 
to overoptimism and overconfidence by highlighting historical examples and providing 
analysis of the sensitivity of budget calculations to various risks. By increasing fiscal 
transparency a council would make governments more accountable and thus make it harder 
for politicians to pursue their own interests. This could be done through monitoring of off-
budget items and various attempts at creative accounting as well as through sustainability 
analyses. Since too optimistic forecasts seem often to have been used by governments to hide 
prolific fiscal policies, the provision of unbiased forecasts by an independent fiscal institution 
may also contribute to more fiscal discipline.
31 Independent analysis of macroeconomic 
developments also makes it more difficult for incumbent governments to try to signal 
competence to the electorate through deficit-increasing policy that raises output and 
employment only in the short term.  
       The discussion in Section 2.1 also pointed to short-sightedness of governments and time-
inconsistency problems as important causes of excessive debt accumulation and to fiscal rules 
as an appropriate method to address these problems. Monitoring by independent fiscal policy 
councils that governments adhere to such rules is a way of making the rules more binding. It 
is well-known that fiscal rules strengthen the incentives for creative accounting to circumvent 
the rules.
32 A fiscal policy council can help spot such attempts and renounce them publicly. A 
council can therefore be a complement to a rule: it gives the council a benchmark to evaluate 
government policy against.
33 At the same time, more elaborate monitoring of adherence to a 
fiscal rule by an independent institution can allow the rule to be more flexible, permitting 
more contingencies: independent evaluations make it less necessary for a government to earn 
credibility through mechanical application of a simple and more easily monitored rule. For 
example, a fiscal policy council could add to the public’s understanding of whether a 
government’s explanation of a deviation from the fiscal target is convincing.
34 
                                                 
30 See Rogoff and Bertelsmann (2010) and von Hagen (2010) for elaboration of these points. 
31 This point has been emphasised in particular by Jonung and Larch (2006). 
32 See for example von Hagen and Wolff (2006). 
33 See also Debrun et al. (2009). 
34 See the discussion in Section 2.3.   13
       To the extent that one tries to address the common pool problem through a fiscal rule, an 
independent council again helps if it strengthens the incentives to observe the rule. But some 
fiscal institutions have also been designed to deal more directly with the common-pool 
problem by acting as mechanisms for coordinating various interests through the formulation 
of fiscal targets that are to serve as basis for budget negotiations. The Public Debt Committee 
in Austria and the HCF in Belgium are two examples.
35 Both these institutions have members 
nominated by various levels of government. However, this form of “representative” 
nomination could make it more difficult to fulfil an independent watchdog function. This risk 
appears particularly great in the Belgian case as the HCF is chaired by the Minister of 
Finance. The risk seems much smaller in the Netherlands where the CPB, which is a pure 
expert body, provides analyses of the macroeconomic and public-finance consequences of 
draft agreements between prospective coalition partners in the negotiating process preceding 
the formation of a new government.
36  
 
3.1 Tasks of a fiscal watchdog 
A number of possible tasks for a fiscal policy council can be identified from both actual 
practice and various proposals. They can be summarised as follows:
37 
  The provision of “objective” macroeconomic forecasts on which government budget 
proposals can be based. This is done by, for example, the CPB in the Netherlands and 
the newly created Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in the UK. 
  Costing of various government policy initiatives as done by, for example, the CBO in 
the US, the CPB in the Netherlands and the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) in 
Canada. 
  Ex ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term targets. 
Two examples are the Fiscal Council in Hungary and the OBR in the UK. 
  Ex post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets. This is a key task for 
the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.  
  Analysis of the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy. Such analyses are performed 
by, for example, the CPB in the Netherlands, the CBO in the US, the Public Debt 
                                                 
35 von Hagen (2010), 
36 Bos and Teulings (2010). 
37 See Debrun et al. (2009), von Hagen (2010) and Mihály for surveys of the tasks of various fiscal institutions. 
Bos and Teulings (2010) provide specific information on the Netherlands, Calmfors (2008, 2010a) on Sweden, 
Kopits and Romhányi (2010) on Hungary, Office for Budget Responsibility (2010a,b) on the UK, and Page 
(2010) on Canada.    14
Committee in Austria, the Fiscal Council in Hungary and the Fiscal Policy Council in 
Sweden. 
  Normative recommendations on fiscal policy. Only a few independent fiscal 
institutions engage in this. They include the Austrian Public Debt Committee, the 
Danish Economic Council and the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council. 
 
The appropriate tasks for an independent fiscal policy council depend on the institutional 
environment. For example, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council specialises in broader, overall 
evaluations of fiscal policy of a less-routine character with a heavy academic input, but does 
not engage in forecasting or in detailed budget projections. This is a natural choice given the 
existence of other government agencies with an acquired reputation for independent analysis. 
These include the National Institute for Economic Research (Konjunkturinstitutet), which 
provides independent macroeconomic forecasts as well as analyses of the effects of various 
tax and labour market reforms, and the Office for Budget Management 
(Ekonomistyrningsverket), which is responsible for continuously updating government budget 
forecasts and for the government’s annual financial statement. In countries where such other 
institutions do not exist, these activities could instead be performed by a fiscal policy council. 
This is the reason why macroeconomic forecasting is done by, for example, the CPB in the 
Netherlands, the Economic Council in Denmark, the Fiscal Council in Hungary and the OBR 
in the UK. 
      The scope of activities of a fiscal watchdog obviously determines the resources needed. 
These also vary strongly among countries depending on the tasks. At one extreme is the CBO 
in the US with around 230 employees. The size is explained by the remit which includes 
macroeconomic forecasting, annual analysis of the President’s budget, cost estimates of bills 
reported by congressional committees, long-term projections of macroeconomic trends as well 
as of federal revenues and expenditures, and analysis of the impact of policy changes on 
future budgets (“scoring”).
38 At the other extreme is the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, which 
carries out its more overall evaluations with a hired staff of only four persons (and a council 
of eight members performing their work as side activities to their ordinary employment). In 
between these polar cases are, for example, the Hungarian Fiscal Council and the Danish 
Economic Council (with staff of around 30 persons in addition to three full-time council 
members in Hungary and four chairs performing their work as side activities to their normal 
                                                 
38 See Debrun et al. (2009).   15
employment in Denmark). Given the variation in tasks it is impossible to define an optimal 
size. However, it is the view of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council that its resources fall 
substantially short of what is required for a sustainable activity.
39 
       There might emerge goal conflicts between the possible tasks for a fiscal policy council 
listed above. There is a risk that making forecasts and giving normative ex ante policy 
recommendations could make it more difficult to do unbiased ex post evaluations of 
government policy. As forecasts are likely to be wrong most of the time – and sometimes very 
wrong – engaging in this activity could also weaken the credibility of the council in the public 
eye and make it harder to fulfil other tasks.
40 
 
 Does a watchdog need official status? 
It is sometimes asked why academics and other economic experts cannot just participate in 
the general public debate with forecasts, analyses, evaluations and recommendations either as 
individuals or as groups set up by various private institutions? Why would they need the 
stamp of being an official fiscal policy council? There are three possible answers to these 
questions. 
1.  A first answer is that having an official status does give more influence. Since there 
are many players competing for media attention, an official status gives an edge. 
Influence in the long term must, however, mainly build on the reputation (the 
institutional capital) that can be built up over time only through analysis that is 
perceived to be impartial and of high quality. 
2.  A second answer is that an official council can be given a formal role in the budget 
process, such that an arena for repeated exchange between politicians and civil 
servants on the one hand and council members on the other hand are created. This can 
be done in several ways: through the provision of forecasts and analytical input to be 
used in the preparation of the budget, through explicit policy recommendations to the 
government at some stage of the budget process, through evaluation of government 
proposals or through regular hearings with council members in the parliament. 
3.  The most important motivation for having an official fiscal watchdog may, however, 
be to commit independent academics and other economic experts to a sustained and 
consistent participation in the public discussion about fiscal policy. Being appointed to 
a fiscal policy council means a commitment to be up to date on fiscal policy issues 
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that may be difficult to get otherwise. With increasing research specialisation and 
increasing requirements on academic publishing, it seems to be becoming gradually 
more difficult to get academics to set aside time to take part in the economic policy 
debate. At the same time, the number of issues that economists study has widened 
dramatically. The establishment of an independent fiscal policy council can be seen as 
an institutional arrangement to re-direct academic talent in the direction of fiscal 
policy evaluation.
41 This could be interpreted as a remedy for a “market failure”: 
private demand for the services that a fiscal policy council can provide may not be 
large enough to generate the resources needed to make academics allocate sufficient 
time to such work. 
 
Democratic legitimacy 
A criticism sometimes advanced against independent fiscal watchdogs is that is 
“undemocratic” to have unelected experts evaluate elected representatives.
42 The obvious 
counterargument is that such a watchdog provides a basis for decisions that take account of 
both the preferences of the majority of voters and economic constraints in a more rational way 
than would otherwise be the case (see Section 2.1). By providing better information for 
citizens, the possibilities of holding policy makers accountable are also increased. 
              It is important how the mandate of a fiscal policy council is formulated. From a 
democratic point of view it is hard to see objections against forecasts or analyses of the 
consequences of specific proposals by an independent council. The issue is more contentious 
when a council evaluates policy or makes normative recommendations. Even it the council is 
only advisory, agenda-setting power means a large influence over policy. For this reason, a 
council should not itself formulate the economic-policy objectives that guide its activities but 
instead base them on objectives formulated by the political system. Policy evaluations and 
recommendations should only concern the possibilities of reaching these objectives. This is 
also the way existing councils function. 
       One cannot, of course, dismiss the possibility that a fiscal policy council could misuse its 
powers and define its own political agenda, although this is likely to lead to a loss of 
reputation and influence. How large this risk is depends to some extent on how council 
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members are chosen (see Section 3.2). One way of reducing the risk of improper “political” 
behaviour could be to organise recurring international “peer reviews” of council activities.  
       A related issue is how a fiscal watchdog should time its activities relative to the political 
debate. The CPB in the Netherlands has a deliberate policy of trying to be ahead of the debate 
but to be more cautious once a debate on a certain topic is running between the political 
parties or between other interest groups.
43 In a similar vein, the independent chairs of the 
Danish Economic Council do not participate in the public debate before elections. Such a 
stand is not, however, unproblematic. It could just as well be argued that the input of an 
independent council is particularly important in situations of on-going political debates if 
citizens are to be able to form informed opinions. For this reason, the Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council has not formulated similar constraints on its activities as the CPB in the Netherlands 
and the Economic Council in Denmark.
44 
       A  particular  problem  concerns  the  relationship between fundamental, higher-level 
objectives and intermediate targets. If the government has formulated a fiscal rule entailing a 
medium-term, intermediate budget target, it is a straightforward task to evaluate whether 
fiscal policy conforms to that target. But one could very well argue that a fiscal policy council 
should also have the task of analysing whether such a target conforms to the higher-level 
objectives of fiscal policy. Indeed, given the expertise that a fiscal policy council is likely to 
have, it may be considered particularly suitable to make such an analysis.
45 
       The terms of reference for the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council state that it should assess 
“to which extent the government’s fiscal policy objectives are being achieved. These 
objectives include long-run sustainability, the surplus target, the ceiling on central 
government expenditure and that fiscal policy is consistent with the cyclical situation of the 
economy.” The council has interpreted sustainability as a fundamental, higher-level objective 
and has for this reason evaluated the consistency of the surplus target (for government net 
lending) with it at the same time as it has evaluated to what extent fiscal policy has conformed 
to the surplus target in the medium term. 
       However, it could also be argued that it could be (or could be believed by the general 
public to be) more difficult for a fiscal watchdog to evaluate whether the intermediate target is 
met if it views this target as inconsistent with the fundamental, higher-level objectives. In my 
view, the advantages of analysing the consistency between higher-level objectives and 
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45 See Finanspolitiska rådet (2008), Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009a, 2010), and Calmfors (2005, 2010a).   18
intermediate objectives are likely to outweigh the disadvantages. It should be possible to 




3.2 The set-up of a fiscal policy council 
Regarding the set-up of a fiscal policy council, several aspects should be considered: 
  Independence 
  Composition  
  Influence 
 
Independence 
If a fiscal policy council is to act successfully as a countervailing force to fiscal 
irresponsibility arising from inherent tendencies in the political process, independence from 
the political sphere should be granted in much the same way as for central banks.
47 A council 
should have a clear mandate to pursue its remit in an independent way without government 
intervention in its activities. There should be a long-term budget for the council so that it does 
not have to fear that its resources may be cut if it reaches politically unpopular conclusions.
48 
Long-term and non-renewable appointments are a way of reducing the risk that council 
members are unduly affected by re-appointment concerns. The benefits of this must, however, 
be balanced against the risk that long periods of office could make it harder to recruit 
members, especially from academia (see also the next section). There is also the problem that 
“low turnover” of council members could hamper the influx of new ideas. The Fiscal Council 
in Hungary where appointments are for nine years and non-renewable is an example of long 
periods of office.
49 In contrast, appointments to the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council are only 
for (maximum) three years.
50 
       An important question is whether a fiscal policy council should be an agency under the 
government or under the parliament. The CBO in the US and the PBO in Canada are 
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47 See also Debrun et al. (2009) and Calmfors (2010a). 
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publication of reports that were regarded as controversial by the government (Page 2010). 
49 Kopits and Rományi (2010). 
50 The first members were appointed for a three-year period (2007-2010). After the first three-year period, 
appointments were made for only one year. The probable reason is that the government wanted an option to re-
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examples of fiscal watchdogs attached to the parliament.
51 So is the Fiscal Council in 
Hungary in the sense that its members are elected by the parliament.
52 In contrast, for 
example, the Economic Council in Denmark, the Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden and the 
OBR in the UK are all formally government bodies with appointments made by the 
government.
53 Putting a council under the parliament rather than the government is a way of 
emphasising that the council has a more independent standing than an ordinary government 
agency. It would also mean that decisions on the council’s budget are taken in a different way 
than for other government agencies. Still, in a parliamentary democracy the difference 
between being under the parliament and being under the government may not be large, as 
MPs usually do not act in an independent way relative to the government. 
       A possible protection against political appointments is to have members appointed after 
proposals from the council itself. This procedure has been followed for the Economic Council 
in Denmark and it has been replicated in Sweden. The idea is to create a reputational cost for 
the government of not following the proposals. 
       A pertinent question concerns the nature of contacts between a fiscal policy council and 
the government: should they be both ex ante and ex post or only ex post. It may be thought 
that a council could exert greater influence on policy if it can give advice to the government in 
the process of preparing the budget before the government has made its stand public which it 
may be difficult to back from. Such ex ante advising behind “closed doors” would, however, 
make it more difficult for the council to make an independent ex post evaluation. For this 
reason, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council has chosen not to have any ex ante contacts with 
the government (before publication of its annual report).
54 The council meets the Minister for 
Finance only in connection with the delivery of the report. In contrast, the arrangements for 
the interim Office for Budget Responsibility in the UK have been less clear in this respect, as 
the terms of reference allow it “to consult the Chancellor in preparing documents”.
55 The 
experiences of the CPB in the Netherlands illustrate the risks associated with such procedures. 
Bos and Teulings (2010) claim that the regular meetings that take place with cabinet ministers 
                                                 
51 The director of the CBO in the US is appointed jointly by the House of Representatives and the Senate and can 
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52 The President of the Republic, the Governor of the National Bank and the President of the State Audit Office 
nominate one candidate each (Kopits and Rományi 2010). 
53 The currently existing OBR in the UK has been set up as an interim government agency, but it is stipulated in 
the terms of reference that it should be accountable to the Parliament. The OBR is now in the process of being 
transformed into a permanent office. It is likely that the Treasury Select Committee in Parliament will get the 
right to veto the appointment of the chair of the OBR (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2010). 
54 Calmfors (2010a). 
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are used to put pressure on the bureau to change parts of its analysis that do not fit the views 
of the government. 
       The UK provides an example of how problematic close cooperation between a fiscal 
watchdog and the ministry of finance can be. The institutional set-up chosen so far is that the 
OBR prepares a pre-budget forecast that is used by the Treasury in its work on the budget bill. 
But the office also prepares an analysis of the actual budget which is presented 
simultaneously with the budget. This timing would seem to invite problems, as it requires an 
on-going exchange between the office and the Treasury during the budget process that could 
make it difficult to make an independent evaluation.
56 At least it is obvious that such a 
procedure makes the relationship between the watchdog and the ministry of finance less 
transparent. A more transparent procedure would be for the watchdog to deliver its analysis of 
the budget ex post. 
        A risk that should not be underestimated derives from the fact that in a small county – 
almost – everybody in a field such as economic policy-making and economic policy analysis 
knows each other. This means that when evaluating government policy, council members are 
likely to be evaluating people they know well and may have worked or studied together with. 
This may create a psychological bias to be “too kind”. This problem is difficult to cope with. 





There are at least four possible pools of people from which council members could be 
recruited: 
  Academic researchers 
  Public finance experts from various parts of government administration 
  Analysts in the financial sector 
  Ex-politicians 
 
Academics and public finance experts from government administration seem to be the most 
common recruitment pools for existing fiscal policy watchdogs.
59 Academics could be 
                                                 
56 Indeed, the independence of the OBR’s analysis of the new British government’s first budget in June this year 
was immediately called into question. The credibility problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the OBR 
was at its start provisionally staffed by economists on temporary leave from the Treasury. See Giles (2010), 
Financial Times (2010) and Calmfors (2010b).  
57 In the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council’s first years of existence the vice chair has been from Denmark. 
58 See also Calmfors (2010a). 
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expected to apply fresh research perspectives. Another important advantage of academics 
concerns independence: since academics’ main arena is another one than politics and 
government administration, their judgements are likely to be less affected by political 
concerns than those of most other groups. There would be a high reputational cost in the 
academic arena for researchers who were seen to be acting in a political way in the council 
rather than making research-based judgements.
60 
       Academics are not, however, likely to have the expert knowledge of government budgets 
and government accounting that may be necessary to make detailed assessments of budget 
bills and public finance forecasts. This is an argument for also including public finance 
experts with a background in government administration. But there could be a risk that they 
are to a larger extent than academics influenced by concerns over future career possibilities in 
government administration. An alternative are analysts from the financial sector. A 
disadvantage with them might, however, be loyalties to earlier or (expected) future employers 
in the sector. 
       A final possibility is to use ex-politicians. In the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, two ex-
politicians (a former Social Democratic Minister for Finance and a former Vice Chair of the 
Swedish Tory Party) complement six academics. The presence of well-known former 
politicians, in addition to economic experts, may be important for the legitimacy of a fiscal 
policy watchdog. It may help fend off the usual critique that academics are too far-off from 
the “real world” to be able to make useful inputs in the public policy debate. More 
importantly, the impact of a council is promoted if politicians from different parts of the 
political spectrum endorse its conclusions. A possible drawback is that former politicians may 
be restricted in their analyses by the earlier positions they have taken in public. They might 
for this reason be less open than academics to new thinking when new problems arise and in 
this way confine the analysis. 
       An alternative way of linking independent evaluations to the political sphere is to let a 
broader set of people representing various interests express their views on reports written by 
pure experts. This is done in Denmark, where the Economic Council’s four independent 
chairs produce semi-annual reports that are commented on by representatives (in fact as many 
as 26) of unions, employers, the central bank and the government.
61  
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       My overall conclusion is that, for reasons of independence, the majority of the members 
of a fiscal council should be academics, but that it could be wise to complement them with 
members with other backgrounds. 
 
Influence 
In the long term, the influence of a fiscal watchdog is determined by the quality of its work. 
To be influential it must earn a reputation for good and impartial analysis. Such a reputation 
can create a media pressure that makes it difficult for the government to ignore the 
watchdog’s analyses and recommendations. Examples of institutions that have over time 
acquired a reputation that gives them a strong position in the public debate are the CPB in the 
Netherlands and the Economic Council in Denmark. In contrast, similar bodies in Germany 
do not seem to have succeeded in this respect.
62 
      It is important that the analyses of an independent council are not perceived as always 
mechanically recommending more fiscal restraint than the government, but as being 
genuinely open-minded and taking account of the specifics of every situation. For this reason, 
the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council’s recommendation to the government in 2009 to take 
stronger stimulative fiscal action to counter the recession (at the same time as long-term fiscal 
restraint was advocated) probably enhanced the council’s reputation for an open-minded 
analysis.
63  
       The exact mandate of a fiscal watchdog matters for its impact. Ideally, one would hope 
that purely impartial analysis involving forecasts, analyses of the fiscal effects of various 
actions, sustainability calculations etc. has a strong influence on policy decisions. In my view, 
this is unlikely to be the case, as it requires a large effort on the part of journalists and other 
“consumers” of the watchdog’s analyses to convert them into clear-cut policy conclusions. 
Normative evaluations and recommendations are likely to carry more weight – provided that 
they are underpinned by good analysis – as they provide the public with a clear benchmark 
against which to judge current policy. 
       In the short term, the government’s attitude to a fiscal policy council is very important. A 
government can give it a “flying start” by committing to build on its analyses and heed its 
advice. The OBR in the UK provides an example: the government has committed to build its 
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visibility and respect by the government and or their professional peers, with the result that their reports and 
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63 Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009a,b and 2010) and Calmfors (2010a).   23
budget bill on the forecasts of the office and to be guided by its assessments of whether the 
fiscal targets are likely to be met. The government can also enhance the status of the 
watchdog by institutionalising its responses to the reports produced, for example through 
regularly including comments to it in the budget bill and other policy documents. The 
parliament can contribute by regularly organising public hearings on the basis of the 
watchdog’s reports.
 64 
       One should, however, expect the government’s appreciation of a fiscal watchdog to be 
greater ex ante than ex post. This is clearly illustrated by the experiences of the Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council, where the government’s comments have over time become more 
critical as it has tried to defuse critique from the council through pejorative remarks on its 
work.
65 It is not clear, however, what effect this has, as it also strengthens the picture of the 
council as an institution that is independent of the government. 
 
3.3 Fiscal watchdogs and the European dimension 
A natural question is how independent fiscal policy councils fit into the European context. It 
is a common conclusion in the current discussion of economic governance in the EU that 
more stringent national fiscal frameworks are key to improve adherence to the fiscal rules in 
the stability pact.
66 The establishment of national fiscal policy councils has been pointed to as 
one way of achieving this. One possibility could be that the Commission and the Ecofin 
Council regularly ask the views of national fiscal watchdogs when evaluating the stability and 
convergence programmes that member states are obliged to submit. This would also represent 
a way of boosting the status of the watchdogs at the national level.  
       There are also proposals to set up an independent fiscal council at the European level.
67 
One idea would be to let such an institution monitor that national fiscal frameworks meet 
certain minimum standards. A European fiscal council (possibly with an input from national 
council) could also have a role to play in the broader macroeconomic surveillance of member 
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states on which there seems now to be an emerging consensus.
68 The rationale for such 
broader macroeconomic surveillance is the insight from the recent Irish and Spanish 
experiences on how fiscal surpluses can very quickly turn into unsustainable deficits when the 
economy goes from boom to bust. Such surveillance must be of a judgemental character and 
is therefore exposed to even larger risks of political interference than pure fiscal surveillance, 
which can be more rules-based. This is a strong argument for why broader macroeconomic 
surveillance should be carried out by an independent European body. 
       Finally,  a  European  fiscal  council  could have a role to play in overseeing national 
councils. It could provide the international “peer reviews” of the national bodies that I 
discussed in Section 3.1 as a safeguard against their overstepping their mandates.  
        
4 The general problem of providing sufficient research input into the political process
69 
As is clear from the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, deficit bias can to a large extent be seen as 
arising from insufficient understanding of the consequences of excessive government debt 
accumulation. To the degree that this is the case, it is a manifestation of the general problem 
of too little analytical (research) input, or at least of too little attention being paid to such 
input, in the political process at large. This motivates a broader discussion of how to secure 
that available research is sufficiently taken account of in the economic policy-making in 
general. 
       The ideal process is one where policy is conducted by well-intending politicians who try 
to maximise a well-defined social preference function. In that case politicians are eager to 
obtain relevant knowledge about behavioural relationships from researchers. Given 
knowledge about various trade-offs, politicians then seek to achieve the best outcomes 
possible. 
              This idealistic picture is probably far from reality. One can also see politicians as 
representatives of various interests who try to strike a balance between their preferences and 
their desire to get re-elected. In this balancing act, politicians use many instruments. Research 
is one. For this reason, politicians have a strong temptation to use research strategically by 
emphasising results that give arguments in favour of their preferred policies and trying to 
discredit results that provide arguments against them. Whereas peer pressure in academia 
provides a strong incentive to separate as clearly as possible value judgements and the 
analysis of various relationships, politicians have a strong incentive to try instead to confound 
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value judgements and research results to further their political aims. To the extent that they 
succeed in this, they are likely to be rewarded by both their political parties and the electorate. 
 
4.1 In-house advising or external evaluation 
My discussion raises the issue of finding institutional forms for securing a sufficient impact 
on the economic policy-making process from research input. One can distinguish between two 
ways of doing this: in-house advising inside government ministries and agencies and 
analysis/recommendations from external evaluators.  
      Although the scale varies, most governments make widespread use of panels of outside 
economic experts, mainly from academia, who are used for in-house policy-advising. This 
form of providing research input, however, suffers from the drawback that (active) 
researchers, on temporary assignments, have great problems in asserting themselves against 
other, more permanent, interests in the internal decision-making process within a ministry or a 
government agency. To do that is just not the comparative (nor the absolute) advantage of 
researchers.
70  
       External analysis and policy recommendations that are made public have the advantage 
that policy makers must take a public stand regarding them and provide explanations if they 
are not taken into account. In, for example, Sweden there seems to be a media logic involving 
an increased interest among journalists of confronting policy makers with external expert 
opinions.
71 External evaluations also imply smaller risks that the researchers involved will 
become co-opted in an ongoing advising process than in-house advising. Clearly, it may be 
much more difficult to criticise sharply the policies of decision-makers if policy 
recommendations are given repeatedly in cosy in-house meetings than if they are given at 
arm’s length distance.
72 
       One should not see in-house advising and external evaluation as substitutes. Instead, they 
should be regarded as complements. To the extent that external evaluation exposes lack of 
analytical competence within ministries and government agencies, there is an incentive to 
acquire more such competence to match the external monitoring. There are also often on-
going struggles within government ministries between civil servants wanting more research 
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71 Calmfors (2009a). 
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input and politicians wanting to press ahead with various policies on their agenda. In such 
cases, the hands of civil servants will be strengthened by external monitoring.  
 
4.2 A broader remit for a fiscal policy council? 
A natural question is whether a fiscal policy council could be given a broader remit than just 
to evaluate budget outcomes. Some of the existing independent institutions discussed in 
Section 3 have such a broader remit. The CPB in the Netherlands undertakes research on a 
broad range of economic issues including also employment and regulatory policies as well as 
resource depletion and financial crises.
73 Similarly, the Economic Council in Denmark 
provides judgements also on tax, employment and other structural policies as well as on 
environmental issues.
74 The Council of Wise Men (Sachverständigenrat) in Germany 
analyses a wide range of issues.
75 
       The  Swedish  Fiscal  Policy  Council,  too,  has  a  much  broader  remit  than  just  budget 
policy.
76 It is also to “evaluate whether economic developments are in line with healthy long-
run growth and sustainable high employment”. This has motivated analyses of, for example, 
the reforms of unemployment and sickness insurance, changes in labour market policy, the 
introduction of an earned income tax credit and tax deductions for household-related services, 
and the use of regular education as a countercyclical tool. In addition, the council is instructed 
to examine “the clarity of the government’s budget bill and spring fiscal policy bill, in 
particular with respect to the grounds given for economic policy and the motivations for 
policy proposals”. This is complemented with a general instruction to “work to achieve an 
increased public discussion in society of economic policy”. One can interpret these latter tasks 
as a general one of being a “debate watchdog” helping to raise the general quality of the 
economic policy discussion.  
       How should one regard such an extended remit for a fiscal policy council? There are both 
drawbacks and benefits. A drawback is that the resources of the council are spread more 
thinly. There is also a risk that interest in less tangible long-run fiscal sustainability issues 
among the general public is crowded out by more concrete short-run issues concerning youth 
unemployment, specific tax proposals etc. The experiences of the Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council indicate that these risks are real: the analyses of employment and tax issues have 
received much more media attention than the analyses of fiscal sustainability and fiscal 
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frameworks. A benign interpretation is, however, that this could reflect the strong public 
finances in Sweden, which make fiscal sustainability issues less pressing than elsewhere. 
       There are also great benefits with the Swedish council’s broad remit. An argument for 
simultaneous analysis of fiscal sustainability and employment is the strong interaction 
between them. All the additional tasks are also important ones. If one wants to have high 
visibility for economic policy analyses, it may not be possible to have a host of different 
evaluating agencies (as witnessed by the experiences of Germany).
77 At least in a small 
country, it might be difficult to fill a multitude of independent evaluating institutions with 
sufficiently competent staff. There may also be a greater impact if several types of analysis 
are made by one institution with a solid reputation than by a large number of institutions that 
the public may have difficulties to identify. At the same time, a “monopoly situation” for an 
policy-evaluating institution may entail risks.  
       It is not obvious how one should trade off the advantages of an extended remit for a fiscal 
policy council against the disadvantages. There is not likely to be a unique solution that is 
optimal for all countries. If there already exist other independent or semi-independent 
government institutions that do more detailed macroeconomic forecasting and analyses of 
public finances – as is the case in Sweden – it seems more appropriate than otherwise to 
extend the remit of a fiscal watchdog in the way that has been done there. The argument for 
this is much weaker if independent institutions analysing and evaluating policy in other areas 
have already been established. Another important factor is the economic situation. In 
countries with severe fiscal problems it is probably wise, at least initially, to focus an 
independent council’s activities only on them.  
 
4.3 Is there a risk of a political bias? 
When the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council was set up, the concern that there would be a 
political bias in the council’s analyses and recommendations was raised. The position of the 
Left Party was that “there is reason to assume that the Fiscal Policy Council will be another 
body providing false scientific clothing for the government’s right-wing policy”.
78 In the UK 
there might be similar concerns that the Office for Budget Responsibility has been established 
to provide analytical support for traditional Tory policies. 
       To the extent that there is any political bias in the activities of an institution like the 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, I would expect it to be of another type. With a remit to 
                                                 
77 See Section 3.2. 
78 Motion 2006/07:Fi7.   28
evaluate government policy, it is natural that such analysis focuses mainly on the scope for 
improvement rather than on praising the already good. So the reports of an independent 
council with such a task is likely always to contain substantial parts that are critical of various 
government policies and recommendations on what is perceived as better policies. But if the 
political opposition’s proposals are not subjected to similar critical evaluations, an impression 
may be created that the council is more critical of the incumbent government’s policies than 
of the alternatives proposed by the opposition, even when the reverse is the case.
79 
       In the long term, such a bias problem is likely to be less severe than in the short term, as 
the public will learn that the council makes critical evaluations of the policies of all 
governments. But to correct such a bias in the short term, the remit of an independent council 
would probably have to be extended to evaluations also of the economic policy proposals of 
the opposition. Although this would amount to a substantial extension of the remit, it could be 
justified from the point of view of providing voters with a more complete basis for their 
decisions.
80 An example of how this can be done is the CPB in the Netherlands: a practice has 
developed according to which the larger political parties before elections submit their political 
platforms to the bureau for assessment.
81 
       There is one sense in which the opposition is likely always to benefit more than the 
government from an independent council. This is because a government has access to more 
“research” resources than the opposition. The opposition is therefore likely always to gain in 




5  Conclusions 
The current public debt problems in many advanced economies have focused interest on fiscal 
frameworks. In particular, there has been an increasing interest in independent fiscal 
watchdogs  (fiscal policy councils). Several countries have recently established such 
institutions. They include Sweden (2007), Canada (2008), Hungary (2008), Slovenia (2009) 
and the UK (2010). One source of inspiration has been earlier existing institutions of a similar 
type, such as the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in the Netherlands, the Economic Council in 
                                                 
79 See also Calmfors (2010a). 
80 Wren-Lewis (2010b) has proposed that the remit of the OBR in the UK should be extended to also costing the 
budget proposals of the opposition before an election. 
81 Bos and Teulings (2010). 
82 See also Calmfors (2008, 2010a).   29
Denmark and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the US. Inspiration has also come 
from a series of academic proposals over the last fifteen years. 
              Fiscal watchdogs could have a direct disciplining effect on government budgets by 
helping to increase awareness of the future costs of current deficits. Such watchdogs could 
increase fiscal transparency through monitoring of off-budget items and various attempts at 
creative accounting. Fiscal policy councils can in this way also act as a complement to fiscal 
rules by monitoring that they are observed. 
       Possible tasks for a fiscal policy council include: 
  The provision of “objective” macroeconomic forecasts on which government budget 
proposals can be based. 
  Costing of various government initiatives. 
  Ex ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its medium-term targets. 
  Ex post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets. 
  Analysis of the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy. 
  Normative recommendations on fiscal policy. 
 
The exact remit varies among the existing fiscal watchdogs. Some of them do only positive 
analysis. Others make normative judgements. When this is done, it is based on the fiscal 
objectives formulated by the political system itself. Councils making normative judgements 
are likely to carry more weight than those that do only positive analysis, as they provide the 
public with a clear benchmark against which to judge policy. 
       In the long term, the influence of a fiscal watchdog is determined mainly by the quality of 
its work. To be influential it must earn a reputation for good and impartial analysis. Such a 
reputation will create media pressure that makes it difficult for the government to ignore the 
watchdog’s analyses and recommendations. In the short term, a government can give a 
watchdog a “flying start” by committing to build on its analysis and heed its advice. It is 
important to establish institutional forms for the interaction between the watchdog on the one 
hand and the government and the parliament on the other. 
       If a fiscal policy council is to act successfully as a guardian of responsible fiscal policy, 
independence from the political sphere should be granted in much the same way as for central 
banks. A council should have a clear mandate to pursue its remit in an independent way 
without government intervention. It should have a long-term budget. The independence of a   30
fiscal policy council is promoted if the majority of council members is made up of academics, 
since they do not depend on the political sphere for their careers. 
       To the extent that deficit bias arises from insufficient understanding of the consequences 
of excessive government debt accumulation, it can be seen as a manifestation of the general 
problem of too little analytical (research) input into the economic policy process at large. This 
raises the question of whether fiscal policy councils should have a broader remit than just to 
monitor fiscal policy. Indeed, independent institutions in some countries have such a broader 
remit, involving also tax, employment and other structural polices. This is the case for the 
Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands and the Economic Council in Denmark. The 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, too, has such a broader remit. It includes the role of a “debate 
watchdog”, since one of the tasks is to examine the clarity of government budget and policy 
bills and the motivations for policy proposals. 
       There are both drawbacks and benefits with such an extended remit. A drawback is that 
resources are spread more thinly. There is also a risk that interest in less tangible fiscal 
sustainability issues among the general public is crowded out by more concrete short-run 
issues concerning specific labour market reforms, tax policies etc. An argument in favour of 
an extended remit is the strong interaction between fiscal sustainability and high employment. 
A broad remit has also the advantage that there may be a greater impact if several types of 
analysis are made by one institution with a solid reputation than by a host of different 
institutions that the public may have difficulties to identify. In a small country, it might also 
be difficult to find sufficiently qualified staff for a multitude of independent monitoring 
institutions. 
       It is not obvious how to trade off the advantages of an extended remit for a fiscal policy 
council against the disadvantages. Desirable solutions are likely to differ among countries. If 
there already exist other independent government institutions that do detailed macroeconomic 
forecasting and analyses of public finances, there is a stronger case than otherwise for a 
broader remit. The argument for this is weaker if independent institutions analysing and 
evaluating policy in other areas have already been established. In countries with severe fiscal 
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